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We have developed a method to calculate a secret key rate of a continuous-variable quantum key
distribution scheme using four coherent states and postselection for a general model of Gaussian
attacks. We assume that the transmission line and detection process are described by a pair of
Gaussian channels. In our analysis, while the loss and noise on the transmission line are induced
by an eavesdropper, Eve, who can replace the transmission line with a lossless and noiseless optical
fiber, she is assumed inaccessible to the detection process. By separating the transmission noise and
detection noise, we can always extract a larger key compared with the case that all loss and noises
are induced by eavesdropper’s interference. An asymptotic key rate against collective Gaussian
attacks can be determined numerically for given channels’ parameters. The improvement of the key
rates turns out to be more significant for the reverse-reconciliation scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols enable two
remote parties, usually called Alice and Bob, to share a
random bit sequence called the secret key [1–3]. Based
on the laws of physics, the secret key can be proven infor-
mation theoretically secure from an eavesdropper, Eve,
who can access the transmission channels between Alice
and Bob with possibly unlimited technology and com-
putational power. There have been wide activities to
demonstrate QKD beyond the proof-of-principle experi-
ments, and several field tests have been reported [4–15].
In contrast to several no-go theorems in Gaussian
continuous-variable (CV) quantum information protocols
[16–19], CV-QKD protocols enjoy quantum optical ho-
modyne measurements and the properties of coherent
states to offer possible solution in quantum safety [20].
In addition to the study of quantum optical methods,
CV-QKD schemes potentially have advantage in practi-
cal implementation. They could be operated with com-
mercially available detectors and deployed in lit fiber net-
works possibly with the presence of classical channels
[21–23]. An important theoretical challenge is to estab-
lish mathematical proof of general safety [24]. It would
be crucial to address how to generate secure local oscil-
lator signals [25–29].
Physically, an essential point in QKD protocols is that
quantum mechanical states are employed so that Eve’s ef-
fort to read the transmission signal unavoidably induces
errors on Bob’s observation of the transmitted states.
The amount of the secret key is usually calculated con-
servatively assuming that any observed signal loss and
noises are induced by Eve. In practice, a portion of the
loss and noises is induced at Bob’s detector. Since the de-
tector is inside Bob’s station it is feasible to assume that
the detection process is inaccessible to Eve [1]. There-
fore, if one can know how much part of the decoherence
is given at the detector, a better key rate will be esti-
mated by using the fact that Eve cannot extract corre-
lation from the noise added inside Bob’s station. Such
scenario has been investigated in discrete-variable QKD
schemes [30, 31]. In CV-QKD schemes, Gaussian descrip-
tion of state-evolution is a basic approach to model the
system performance. In the Gaussian modulated CV-
QKD scheme, Eve’s inaccessibility to the detector noise
has been readily taken into account assuming the action
of Gaussian channels [14, 32–35]. However, these effects
have little been studied in types of CV-QKD schemes
which use discrete modulation and postselection [36–41].
For the postselection protocols of Refs. [36, 38, 39],
an asymptotic key rate against collective Gaussian at-
tacks was determined both in the direct reconciliation
(DR) and reverse reconciliation (RR) scenarios [42, 43].
For these discrete-modulation CV-QKD protocols, it has
been unknown that a Gaussian attack could be the opti-
mal attack, and the key rate against general attacks could
be much lower than the key rate against Gaussian attacks
[44]. Note that another type of discrete-modulation CV-
QKD protocols which does not employ postselection has
been investigated in Refs. [45–47].
In this paper, we investigate the security of the four
state CV-QKD protocol [38] when the loss and noises in
the detection process are inaccessible to Eve. We de-
rive a formula to determine Eve’s density operator when
the system describing detector’s loss and noises is sim-
ply traced out. Using this density operator the key rate
against collective Gaussian attacks can be calculated.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we in-
troduce basic notions on our protocol. In Sec. III, we
describe the model of Eve’s attack and how to determine
her density operator. In Sec. IV we show numerically
calculated key rates for a couple of noise parameters. We
conclude this paper in Sec. V.
II. PROTOCOL AND NOTATION
We consider the four coherent-state protocol [38]. We
basically use the same notation as in Ref. [43]. Al-
ice randomly sends one of four coherent states |S〉 ∈
2{|±α〉 , |±iα〉} with α > 0 to Bob. Bob performs quadra-
ture measurement either x-basis or p-basis:
x =
a+ a†
2
, p =
a− a†
2i
, (1)
where the commutation relation [a, a†] = 1 is assumed
to hold. For notation convention, we may refer to the
optical mode transmitted from Alice to Bob as the mode
B. From the sequence that Alice sent |±α〉 and Bob
measured the x quadrature, sifted key is generated by
assigning bit value “0” for Bob’s measurement outcome
m > 0 and bit value “1” for m < 0. The same procedure
is executed for the sequence that Alice sent |±iα〉 and
Bob measured the p quadrature. Bob may announce the
absolute values of his measurement outcomes |m|, and
further classical key agreement procedure will be carried
out by using the index |m|. Due to the phase-space sym-
metry with π/2 rotation, it is sufficient to consider the
case that Alice sends |S〉 = |±α〉 and Bob obtains an
outcome m associated with his measurement of the x
quadrature. We assume linear loss and symmetric Gaus-
sian excess noise through the transmission and detection
of the signal. This implies that Bob’s quadrature distri-
bution when Alice’s signal is S can be written as
P (m|S) =
√
2
π(1 + ξ)
e−2
(m−√ηS)2
1+ξ , (2)
where η is the total transmission and ξ is the total ex-
cess noise. Note that this distribution reduces to the
quadrature distribution of the coherent state |α〉 when
there is no loss and no excess noise, namely, we have
P (x|α) = | 〈x|α〉 |2 when (η, ξ) = (1, 0).
Conditioned on the absolute value of Bob’s outcome
|m|, the transmission is considered to be a binary sym-
metric channel with the bit error rate
ǫ|m| :=
P (−|m||α)
P (m|α) + P (−m|α)
=
P (|m|| − α)
P (m| − α) + P (−m| − α)
=
[
1 + e8
√
η
1+ξ |m|α
]−1
. (3)
From the bit error rate ǫ, the mutual information between
Alice and Bob can be calculated as
IAB = 1− fh(ǫ). (4)
where h(ǫ) = −ǫ log2 ǫ − (1 − ǫ) log2(1 − ǫ) is the binary
entropy function and f ≥ 1 represents an efficiency of
error correction. In what follows, we assume an ideal
error correction and set f = 1.
III. INTERACTION MODEL AND EVE’S
KNOWLEDGE
We consider the physical model of the signal transmis-
sion in Fig. 1. Let us assume the signal is transmitted
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FIG. 1. (Color online)(a) Alice sends a coherent state |α〉
through a lossy and noisy channel. Bob observes quadra-
ture with the total transmission η and the total excess noise
ξ. (b) The transmission channel is modeled by a lossy and
noisy Gaussian channel with the transmission η1 and the ex-
cess noise ξ1. Bob’s detector is modeled by another lossy and
noisy Gaussian channel with the transmission η2 and the ex-
cess noise ξ2 followed by an ideal homodyne detector. (c) The
action of Gaussian channels (ηi, ξi) with i = 1, 2 can be de-
scribed by beamspliter unitaries UBE2 and UBD2 coupling to
two-mode squeezed states, |Φ1〉E and |Φ2〉D.
from Alice to Bob through a lossy and noisy Gaussian
channel with the transmission η1 and excess noise ξ1.
The channel action is virtually described as follows: The
signal is mixed with an ancillary mode E2 of a two-mode
squeezed state |Φ1〉E1E2 at a beamsplitter. Then, the ex-
tra modes E1E2 are traced out. We assume that Eve can
access any signal information leaking out at the transmis-
sion line. This condition can be described by assuming
that Eve holds the extra modes E1E2. The interaction
model with a two-mode squeezed state and a beamsplit-
ter is often called the entangling cloner [48]. Due to the
properties of the two-mode squeezed state, an entangling
cloner induces linear loss and symmetric Gaussian noise
on the signal mode in such a way that Eve holds corre-
lation on the signal noise. There is another interaction
model to simulate this effect with a two-mode squeezer
and two beamsplitters [49].
Let us also assume the signal is transmitted through
another Gaussian channel with the transmission η2 and
excess noise ξ2 at Bob’s detection process in Bob’s sta-
tion. We assume that Eve is unable to access any signal
information leaking out at the detection process inside
Bob’s station. The signal is mixed with an ancillary
mode D2 of a two-mode squeezed state |Φ2〉D1D2 at a
beamsplitter. Then, the extra modes D1D2 are traced
out, and Eve has no chance to hold the purifying modes
D1D2. To this end, our model contains two entangling
3cloners associated with the pair of Gaussian channels.
One is used to describe Eve’s access. The other one as-
sociated with the extra modes D1D2 is used to describe
a realistic detection process .
Let us write Eve’s initial two-mode squeezed state as
|Φ1〉E =
√
2
π
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
dx1dx2 e
−V1x21−x22/V1
×
∣∣∣∣x1 + x2√2
〉
E1
∣∣∣∣x1 − x2√2
〉
E2
(5)
where |x〉Ei is the eigenket of a quadrature operator x
of the mode Ei with eigenvalue x. The parameter V1 is
associated with the channel’s parameters as [50]
1
2
(
V1 +
1
V 1
)
=
1− η1 + ξ1
1− η1 . (6)
Since the coherent state |S〉 can be written as
|S〉 =
(
2
π
) 1
4
∫ ∞
−∞
dx e−(x−S)
2 |x〉 (7)
and the beam splitter of transmission η leads to the trans-
formation
|x〉 |x2〉E2 → |
√
ηx−
√
1− ηx2〉|
√
1− ηx+√ηx2〉E2 ,
(8)
the state after the beam-spliter interaction U (BS) takes
the form of [43]
U
(BS)
BE2 |S〉B |Φ1〉E =
∫ ∞
−∞
dm |m〉B |ψ(S,m)〉E , (9)
where
|ψ(S,m)〉 =
(
8
π3η21
) 1
4
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
dx1dx2 ψ(S,m)
×
∣∣∣∣x1 + x2√2
〉
E1
∣∣∣∣
√
1− η1
η1
m+
x1 − x2√
2η1
〉
E2
(10)
with
ψ(S,m) = e
−
[√
1−η1
2η1
(x1−x2)+ m√η1−S
]2
−V1x21−x22/V1 . (11)
Let us write the initial state of detector’s environment
for the second entangling cloner as
|Φ2〉D =
√
2
π
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
dy1dy2 e
−V2y21−y22/V2
×
∣∣∣∣y1 + y2√2
〉
D1
∣∣∣∣y1 − y2√2
〉
D2
(12)
where the parameter V2 is associated with detector’s pa-
rameters as
1
2
(
V2 +
1
V2
)
=
1− η2 + ξ2
1− η2 (13)
Using the transformation Eq. (8), we can write the state
before the ideal quadrature measurement device as
U
(BS)
BD2 U
(BS)
BE2 |S〉B |Φ1〉E |Φ2〉D =
∫ ∞
−∞
dm |m〉B |ψ′(S,m)〉ED ,
(14)
where
|ψ′(S,m)〉
=
√
2
π
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
dY1dY2√
η2
∣∣∣∣ψ(S, m√η2 +
√
1− η2
η2
Y2)
〉
E
|Y1〉D1
⊗
∣∣∣∣
√
1− η2
η2
m+
Y2√
η2
〉
D2
e−
V2
2 (Y1+Y2)
2− (Y1−Y2)22V2 .
(15)
Since Eve cannot access the information leakage coming
from detector’s environment system D, we trace out the
system D in what follows.
Supposing Bob’s homodyne outcome is m, we obtain
Eve’s density operator:
ρS,m :=trD1D2 |ψ′(S,m)〉 〈ψ′(S,m)|
=
√
4
π
1
V2 +
1
V2
∫
dY |ϕS,m〉 〈ϕS,m| e
− 4Y 2
V2+
1
V2 (16)
where
|ϕS,m〉 =
(
8
π3η21η2
)1/4 ∫∫
dX1dX2
× e−
[√
1−η1
η1
X2+
1√
η1η2
(m+
√
1−η2Y )−S
]2
× e−
V1
2 (X1+X2)
2− (X1−X2)22V1 |X1〉E1
⊗
∣∣∣∣ X2√η1 +
√
1− η1√
η1η2
(m+
√
1− η2Y )
〉
E2
=
∫∫
dx1dx2ϕY (x1, x2) |x1〉E1 |x2〉E2 . (17)
Here, in the final expression, we defined
ϕY (x1, x2) :=
(
8
π3η2
) 1
4
e
−
[√
1−η1x2+
√
η1
η2
(m+
√
1−η2Y )−S
]2
× e−
V1
2
[
x1+
√
η1x2−
√
1−η1
η2
(m+
√
1−η2Y )
]2
× e− 12V1
[
x1−√η1x2+
√
1−η1
η2
(m+
√
1−η2Y )
]2
.
(18)
Further tracing out ρS,m in Eq. (16) we obtain the prob-
ability that Bob gets m conditioned on Alice sends |S〉:
trρS,m =
√
2
π
√
1
1 + ξ1η2 + ξ2
e−2
(m−√η1η2S)2
1+ξ1η2+ξ2 . (19)
Comparing this relation with Eq. (2) we find
η =η1η2,
ξ =ξ1η2 + ξ2. (20)
4This is the central relation to associate the total channel
parameters (η, ξ) with the parameters of the transmission
line (η1, ξ1) and the parameters of the detection process
in Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b. From the expression of ρS,m in
Eq. (16), we define normalized states:
ωi,j =
ρ(−1)i|S|,(−1)j|m|
trρ(−1)i|S|,(−1)j|m|
, (21)
where i, j ∈ {0, 1} can be associated with Alice’s bit and
Bob’s bit, respectively . As we can see from Eq. (16),
Eve’s state ρS,m is susceptible to both Alice’s state prepa-
ration S and Bob’s measurement outcome m. In fact,
Eve’s information can be bounded by the difference of
her states due to the change of the signs of S and m, and
the normalized state ωi,j in Eq. (21) helps us to express
the relevant information quantities [42, 43].
Let us recall the bit error rate ǫ is given in Eq. (3).
In the case of the DR scheme, Eve tries to know Alice’s
preparation of bit. Eve’s knowledge is determined from
the difference of her states with Alice’s choice i = {0, 1},
ρ0A = (1− ǫ)ω00 + ǫω01,
ρ1A = (1− ǫ)ω11 + ǫω10. (22)
In the case of the RR scheme, Eve tries to know Bob’s bit.
Eve’s knowledge is thus determined from the difference
of her states with the sign of Bob’s outcome j = {0, 1},
ρ0B = (1− ǫ)ω00 + ǫω10,
ρ1B = (1− ǫ)ω11 + ǫω01. (23)
Therefore, the information potentially accessible to Eve
is bounded from above by the Holevo quantity
χ =
{
S(ρ)− S(ρ0A)/2− S(ρ1A)/2 for DR,
S(ρ)− S(ρ0B)/2− S(ρ1B)/2 for RR,
(24)
where we define ρ := (ρ0A + ρ
1
A)/2 = (ρ
0
B+ ρ
1
B)/2 and the
von Neumann entropy is given by S(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log2 ρ).
Although we have proceeded our calculation based
on the notation convention of Refs. [42, 43], it may
be instructive to remind the connection to an entan-
glement based picture. In such a picture, Alice pre-
pares a qubit-mode entangled state |φ〉AB = (|0〉A |α〉B+
|1〉A |−α〉B)/
√
2, and sends the mode B to Bob. Note
that the whole system consists of Alice, Bob, Eve, and
detector’s environment, which are respectively denoted
by the subscripts A, B, E, and D. Using the two-mode
squeezed states |Φ1〉, |Φ2〉, and the unitary operators in
Eq. (14), the whole system can be written as a pure state
on the four modes,
|Ψ〉ABDE = U (BS)BD2 U (BS)BE2 |φ〉AB |Φ1〉E |Φ2〉D . (25)
Then, the tripartite state between Alice, Bob, and Eve,
is given by tracing out detector’s environment,
ρABE = trD (|Ψ〉 〈Ψ|) . (26)
Associated with the absolute value of Bob’s measurement
outcome m, this state is filtered as
ρ
|m|
ABE =
PˆmρABEPˆm
tr(PˆmρABEPˆm)
, (27)
where we defined the projector as
Pˆm = |m〉 〈m|B + |−m〉 〈−m|B . (28)
Recall that Alice’s bit value i ∈ {0, 1} can be deter-
mined by projecting her qubit into |i〉A and Bob’s bit
value j ∈ {0, 1} is determined by projecting his mode
into
∣∣(−1)j |m|〉
B
. Therefore, Eve’s states in Eq. (22)
can be written as
ρiA =
trB 〈i| ρ|m|ABE |i〉A
tr 〈i| ρ|m|ABE |i〉A
, (29)
as well as Eve’s states in Eq. (23)
ρjB =
trA
〈
(−1)j|m|
∣∣ ρ|m|ABE ∣∣(−1)j |m|〉B
tr 〈(−1)j |m|| ρ|m|ABE |(−1)j|m|〉B
. (30)
Since we have traced out the system D, it seems dif-
ficult to analytically find all eigenvalues of the relevant
density operators in the Holevo quantity of Eq. (24) in
sharp contrast to the previous approaches [42, 43] where
the rank of the density operators was a few, and analytic
expressions of all eigenvalues were found. In this paper,
we expand the density operator in a photon-number ba-
sis (See appendix A), and determine the Holevo quantity
by numerically finding eigenvalues.
IV. KEY RATES
The secure key against collective Gaussian attacks can
be calculated from the difference between the information
of Alice and Bob in Eq. (4) and Eve’s potential knowledge
in Eq. (24) [43]∫
P (m|α)max[IAB − χ, 0]dm, (31)
where P (m|α) is given by Eq. (2), and we carry out a
postselection process that integrates measurement out-
comes satisfying
max[IAB − χ, 0] ≥ 0. (32)
In our previous work [43], an analytic expression of
the Holevo quantity χ was obtained and a set of the key
rates was shown as a function of transmission distance
with the total excess noise ξ = {0.005, 0.01, 0.02} where
the photon number |S|2 = α2 was selected to maximize
the key rate and the detector was assumed to be an ideal
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FIG. 2. Key rates for the direct reconciliation (DR) scheme and the reverse-reconciliation (RR) scheme with the photon number
α2 = 0.5 and the total excess noise ξ = 0.01. The amount of detector’s excess noise ξ2 is set to 0, 30%, 50% , and 80% of the
total excess noise ξ = 0.01. The circles on the curve of ξ2 = 0 are calculated from the analytic result in Ref. [43].
homodyne detector [In the present notation, this corre-
sponds to (η, ξ) = (η1, ξ1) and (η2, ξ2) = (1, 0)]. Here we
can calculate the key rate for the detector described by a
Gaussian channel. We address the key rate with ξ2 > 0
and η2 = 1 based on the eavesdropping model described
in the previous section.
Figure 2 shows a set of numerically calculated key
rates with the fixed photon number α2 = 0.5 and
the total excess noise ξ = 0.01 for the detector noise
ξ2 = {0, 0.3ξ, 0.5ξ, 0.8ξ} and detection efficiency η2 = 1.
Note that the relations of the channel parameters (η1, ξ1),
the detector parameters (η2, ξ2), and the total observed
transmission η and the total excess noise ξ are given in
Eqs. (20). Note also that the value of the photon number
α2 = 0.5 was close to the optimal photon number that
maximizes the key rates in the case of 0.005 ≤ ξ ≤ 0.02
when the distance d is located somewhere between 5km
and 40km both in the RR and DR schemes [43].
As expected the decay of the key rate is to some extent
delayed as the ratio of the detection noise to the excess
noise ξ2/ξ becomes larger. Notably, this effect is more
significant in the case of the RR scheme. For instance,
if we compare the solid curve of ξ2 = 0 and the dot-
dash-dot curve of ξ2 = 0.8ξ, we can observe that, for a
given key rate G > 10−6, the difference of distance is less
than 5km for the DR scheme whereas the difference of
distance can be more than 15km for the RR scheme. In
both case, our result suggests that one can improve the
key rate by separately specifying the channel parameters
and the detector parameters. An intuitive reason that
the RR scheme has more advantage on specifying the de-
tection noise, is that it becomes harder for Eve to infer
Bob’s outcome as the detection noise inside Bob’s station
becomes larger. The fact that the RR scheme maintains
its flat decay for a longer distance suggests that CV-QKD
schemes could be incorporated with a long distance net-
work beyond the metropolitan networks.
Since initially there is no specific constraint on the
average photon number α2 of four coherent states, we
can choose this parameter so as to extract higher key
rate. The upper panels of Fig. 3 show the maximum
key rates of the DR scheme for the excess noise ξ =
{0.005, 0.01, 0.02} when the photon number α2 is op-
timized. The key rate is basically calculated in each
5km-distance step and photon number step of 0.05 from
d = 5km. The lower panels of Fig. 3 show the corre-
sponding optimized values of the photon number α2.
The upper panels of Fig. 4 show the maximum key
rates of the RR scheme for the excess noise ξ =
{0.005, 0.01, 0.02}. The key rate is basically calculated
in each 5km-distance steps and photon number steps of
0.05 from d = 5km. The lower panels of Fig. 4 show the
corresponding optimized values of the photon number.
For a fixed total excess noise ξ, one can see that the shal-
low decay of the key rates sustains longer as the potion of
the detection noise becomes larger. Thereby, depending
on the distance we can obtain much better key rate by
carefully calibrating the detection noise and the channel
noise, separately.
In optimizing the photon number α2, it could be help-
ful to consider that there are three typical regions on the
distance as follows: (i) For very shorter distances with
smaller loss, Eve’s information could be small. We thus
can use a relatively higher value of the photon number
for such as d ∼ 10km. (ii) For middle distances, the op-
timal photon number becomes smaller and its value is
almost flat as a function of distance. The flatness sug-
gests that the key rates are insensitive to the difference
of the photon number with regards to the scale of such as
0.5 photon number. This could be favorable for a prac-
tical implementation when a fine control of the photon
number is difficult. (iii) Finally for toward long distances,
an increase of the optimal photon number is observed. In
this regime, the key rate would drop more rapidly when
one deviates the value of the photon number from the
optimal value. Thereby, our numerical search of the op-
timal point could take a relatively long time, and the key
rate itself is typically very low.
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FIG. 3. Key rates for the direct reconciliation (DR) scheme as functions of distance with the total excess noise ξ =
{0.005, 0.01, 0.02}. The photon number α2 is chosen to maximize the key rate with 0.05 steps. The amount of detector’s
excess noise ξ2 is set to 0, 30%, 50% , and 80% of the total excess noise ξ.
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FIG. 4. Key rate for the reverse-reconciliation (RR) scheme as functions of distance with the total excess noise ξ =
{0.005, 0.01, 0.02}. The photon number α2 is chosen to maximize the key rate with 0.05 steps. The amount of detector’s
excess noise ξ2 is set to 0, 30%, 50% , and 80% of the total excess noise ξ.
As a summary, both in the DR and RR schemes, the
typical behavior of the key rates with optimized pho-
ton number is no much different from the behavior of
the key rate with the case of the fixed photon num-
ber α2 = 0.5 in Fig. 2 for all cases of the excess noise
ξ = {0.005, 0.01, 0.02}. As far as our model described,
the critical point in experiments is to suppress the excess
noise both in the transmission process and the detec-
tion process as low as possible. An essential observation
is that, for given total excess noise ξ, the optimal pho-
ton number becomes smaller as the portion of detection
noise becomes larger. There is a trade-off relation that
a smaller photon number implies lower information for
Alice and Bob, and larger information leakage for Eve.
Hence, one could not simply suggest that a better choice
of the value of the initial photon number is high or low
when the parameters change. In the present case of the
numerically simulated regime, it turn out that a smaller
7photon number such as α2 ∈ (0.3, 0.5) was widely feasi-
ble. In this respect, systematic numerical study would be
more important to find out efficient settings in operating
our QKD schemes.
V. CONCLUSION
We have developed a method to calculate the key rate
of a CV-QKD scheme using four coherent states for a
model of Gaussian attacks. We assume that the trans-
mission channel and detection process are described by
a pair of symmetric Gaussian channels. The key rate
against collective Gaussian attacks can be essentially cal-
culated for any set of the channel parameters. We use
two entangling cloners to describe the two of the noise
sources. One entangling cloner is assumed to be con-
trolled by Eve as usual and represents the information
leakage for her. The other entangling cloner represents
the detection noise and is located inside Bob’s station.
Thereby, the signal outgoing to detector’s environment
is simply traced out and gives no information leakage
to Eve. We showed numerically determined key rates
as functions of distance for a couple of possible combi-
nations of excess noise parameters. By separating the
channel noise and detection noise, we can always extract
larger key compared with the case that all loss and noises
are induced by Eve’s interference. The improvement of
the key rates turns out to be more significant for the RR
schemes where the increase of inaccessible noises at the
detector is thought to make Eve more difficult to infer
Bob’s outcomes. Note that our study is for an asymp-
totic key rate and limited to the case of eavesdropping
models that induce symmetric Gaussian noise and linear
loss. Since there is no proof that the Gaussian attack is
the optimal attack for CV-QKD schemes with discrete
modulation, achievable key rates in general eavesdrop-
ping scenario could be significant lower than the present
key rates [44]. It may be worth noting that our method
developed here would be applicable to the protocols pro-
posed in Ref. [40], which include an efficient four-state
protocol based on diagonally modulated coherent states,
i.e., the coherent states in the form of |±α± iα〉.
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Appendix A: Number-basis representation of ρS,m in
Eq. (16)
Given a matrix representation of the density operator
ρS,m in Eq. (16), we can determine its eigenvalues nu-
merically. From the set of eigenvalues we can determine
the Von-Neumann entropy and thus the Holevo quantity
χ in Eq. (24). In this appendix we present a basic cal-
culation to expand the relevant density operator in the
number basis so as to determine the matrix elements.
From the wave function of Eq. (17) we can carry out
the integration of Y in ρS,m of Eq. (16). For instance,
we can write
〈x1, x2| ρS,m |x3, x4〉 e−
∑4
i=1 x
2
i
=
√
4
π
1
V2 +
1
V2
∫
dY ϕY (x1, x2)ϕY (x3, x4)e
− 4Y 2
V2+
1
V2
−∑4i=1 x2i
=
√
4
π
1
V2 +
1
V2
√
8
π2Pη2(1 − η2)e
−xtAx+2xtb+c, (A1)
where
P =
(
V1 +
1
V1
)
1− η1
η2
+
2η1
η2
+
4
V2 +
1
V2
1
1− η2 , (A2)
and we defined (A, b, c) so as to get the quadratic form
of x = (x1, x2, x3, x4)
t. The elements of (A, b, c) are
determined as
A =


α1 α3 α4 α6
α3 α2 α6 α5
α4 α6 α1 α3
α6 α5 α3 α2

 , b =


β1
β2
β1
β2

 , (A3)
c = − 4
V2 +
1
V2
m2
1− η2 +
r2
P − 2S
2, (A4)
with the help of the coefficients
α1 = 1− p
2
P +
1
2
(
V1 +
1
V1
)
, (A5)
α2 = 1− q
2
P + (1− η1) +
η1
2
(
V1 +
1
V1
)
, (A6)
α3 = −pqP +
√
η1
2
(
V1 +
1
V1
)
, (A7)
α4 = −p
2
P , α5 = −
q2
P , α6 = −
pq
P , (A8)
β1 =
pr
P , β2 =
qr
P +
√
1− η1S, (A9)
and the constants independent of the elements of x
p = −1
2
(
V1 − 1
V1
)√
1− η1
η2
, (A10)
q =
[
1− 1
2
(
V1 +
1
V1
)]√
η1(1− η1)
η2
, (A11)
r = −2
√
η1
η2
S − 4
V2 +
1
V2
m
1− η2 . (A12)
8Note that (V1, V2) are defined in Eqs. (6) and (13). They
are equivalently written as
Vi = wi +
√
w2i − 1,
wi =
1− ηi + ξi
1− ηi , (A13)
for i = 1, 2.
In order to reach the number state representation, let
us write the wave functions of number states as
|n〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
un(x) |x〉 dx,
un(x) :=
(
2
π
)1/4
1√
2nn!
Hn(
√
2x)e−x
2
,
Hn(x) :=(−1)nex
2 dne−x
2
dxn
. (A14)
With these expressions and Eq. (A1) we can obtain the
matrix element of ρS,m as
〈n1, n2| ρS,m |n3, n4〉
=
2
π
∫∫∫∫
d4x
4∏
i=1
Hni(
√
2xi)e
−x2i√
2nini!
〈x1, x2| ρS,m |x3, x4〉
=
2
π
√
4
π
1
V2 +
1
V2
√
8
π2Pη2(1 − η2)
×
∫∫∫∫ ∞
−∞
4∏
i=1
dxiHni(
√
2xi)√
2nini!
e−x
tAx+2xtb+c.
(A15)
Now, we can numerically determine the matrix ele-
ments. In our numerical approach, the matrix A is diag-
onalized. Then, we have a simpler quadratic form as
xtAx− 2xtb− c
=(A
1
2x−A− 12 b)t(A 12x−A− 12 b)− btA−1b− c
=yty − c′, (A16)
where
y =(y1, y2, y3, y4)
t = A
1
2x+A−
1
2 b, (A17)
c′ =c+ btA−1b. (A18)
The volume element associated with this change of vari-
ables is given by d4x =
∣∣∣∂xi∂yj
∣∣∣ d4y = det(A−1/2)d4y. From
the property of the determinant det(a) det(b) = det(ab),
we can write det(A1/2) =
√
det(A). Using these relations
we have
〈n1, n2| ρS,m |n3, n4〉
=
2
π
√
4
π
1
V2 +
1
V2
√
8
π2Pη2(1− η2)
× e
−c′√
det(A)
∫∫∫∫ ∞
−∞
4∏
i=1
dyiHni(
√
2xi)√
2nini!
e−y
2
i , (A19)
where {xi} will be represented in terms of {yi} through
the inverse of Eq. (A17), namely,
x =A−
1
2 y −A−1b. (A20)
Since the product
∏
iHni(
√
2xi) is a polynomial of
(y1, y2, y3, y4) we can carry out the integration by re-
cursively using the well-known formula for the Gaussian
integral:
∫ ∞
−∞
y2ni e
−y2i dyi =
√
π
(2n− 1)!!
2n
,∫ ∞
−∞
y2n+1i e
−y2i dyi =0, (A21)
for n = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
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